LIMITATIONS FOR A SUCCESSFUL
ARMY LEADER DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY

A Monograph

by

LTC Christopher T. Drew
U.S. Army

MENS EST CLAVIS VICTORIA

School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

2013-01

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			*Form Approved* OMB No. 074-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503

1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)	2. REPORT DATE	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Monograph JUN 2012 – May 2013	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Limitations for a Successful Army Leader Development Strategy		**5. FUNDING NUMBERS**	
6. AUTHOR(S) Christopher T. Drew, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army			
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) School of Advanced Military Studies 250 Gibbon Ave. Ft. Leavenworth, KS 66027		**8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER**	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Command and General Staff College 1 Reynolds Ave. Ft. Leavenworth, KS 66027		**10. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER**	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES			
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION IS UNLIMITED		**12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE**	

13. ABSTRACT *(Maximum 200 Words)*

In 2009, the U.S. Army published the Army Leader Development Strategy to address shortfalls in leader development identified during the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan and the greater Global War on Terror. The effectiveness of the leader development strategy is dependent on coherent objectives communicated across the developmental domains, integrated programs that support the objectives and logical policies that enable the programs. The institutional domain has effectively integrated the objectives across the center of excellence and the schools. In the operational domain, the objectives are communicated, but are not a coherent part of guiding leader development. Within the self-development domain the guidance provided to officers is not nested with the objectives of the overall strategy. The two critical programs are the assignment system and the promotions process. Both programs hinder the execution of the current strategy. The US Code and the unwritten policies within the Army limit the flexibility of the army to accomplish both operational missions and develop officers.

14. SUBJECT TERMS Army Leader Development Strategy, ALDS, development domains			**15. NUMBER OF PAGES** 60
			16. PRICE CODE
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT UNCLASSIFIED	**18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE** UNCLASSIFIED	**19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT** UNCLASSIFIED	**20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT** UNCLASSIFIED

NSN 7540-01-280-5500

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39-18
298-102

MONOGRAPH APPROVAL PAGE

Name of Candidate: LTC Christopher T. Drew

Monograph Title: Limitations for a Successful Army Leader Development Strategy

Approved by:

_____, Monograph Director
Peter J. Schifferle, Ph.D.

_____, Second Reader
G. Scott Gorman, Ph D.

_____, Director, School of Advanced Military Studies
Thomas C. Graves, COL

Accepted this ____day of_____by:

_____, Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

LIMITS FOR A SUCCESSFUL ARMY LEADER DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY, by LTC Christopher T. Drew, 60 pages.

In 2009, the U.S. Army published the Army Leader Development Strategy to address shortfalls in leader development identified during the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan and the greater Global War on Terror. The question examined in this monograph is - what are the factors that limit the effectiveness of the strategy?

The limitations of the Army Leader Development Strategy are examined utilizing the strategy framework of objectives, programs and policies. The effectiveness of the leader development strategy is dependent on coherent objectives communicated across the developmental domains, integrated programs that support the objectives and logical policies that enable the programs. Coherent objectives are determined by examining how effective the subordinate organization's objectives reflect and support the higher organization's objectives. The effectiveness of a program is based on how well the output supports the goals and whether the actions involved in the program conflict with the desired outcomes. A logical policy does not constrain a program from achieving the desired outcomes. The extent that a strategy enables or forces coherent objectives, establishes programs that facilitates the desired outcomes and is supported by policies determines the effectiveness of the strategy.

The coherency of the objectives is critical across all domains of leader development. At this time, the institutional domain has effectively integrated the objectives across the center of excellence and the schools. In the operational domain, the objectives are communicated, but are not a coherent part of guiding leader development. Within the self-development domain, again the intent is communicated, but the guidance provided to officers is general and not nested with the objectives of the overall strategy. The two critical programs are the assignment system and the promotions process. Both programs hinder the execution of the current strategy. The assignment process is bureaucratic and quantitatively focused. Despite the best efforts of career managers little, if any, talent matching occurs during the process. The promotion system also hinders the strategy, by forcing a check the block career progression that favors a very narrow career path. The policies that shape the programs also limit the effectiveness of the strategy. The US Code that prescribes officer strength and promotion timelines, limit the flexibility of the army to accomplish both operational missions and develop officers. The unwritten policies reinforce the bad practices of the promotion system, by narrowly defining success and punishing officers that follow non-standard careers. The adaptation of the Army is critical for the security of the United States. To accomplish the adaptation the policies and programs need to be changed and the objectives need to permeate all three developmental domains.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

> To shape the future force, we must grow leaders who can truly out-think and out innovate adversaries while gaining trust, understanding, and cooperation from our partners in an ever-more complex and dynamic environment. The enduring challenges we face and the whole-of-nation approaches they require demand leaders that have the qualities of flexibility, agility, and adaptability, and the ability to build unique teams of teams to accomplish missions.
>
> *-2011 U.S. National Military Strategy*

General Raymond T. Odierno, in an address to the U.S. Army's Command and General Staff College, stated that his number one priority was leader development and that only through leader development would the army be ready for the future operational environment.[1] In 2009, the U.S. Army published the Army Leader Development Strategy (ALDS) to address recognized shortfalls in leader development and to provide a plan for adapting the Army.[2] The challenges in executing the missions in Afghanistan and Iraq, from the tactical to the strategic level, combined with an acknowledgement that successes were often in spite of the formal leader development system, caused a recognition that the Army needed to do a better job in developing officers for future conflicts. An analysis of the conflicts by the Joint Staff acknowledged that there was "a failure to recognize, acknowledge, and accurately define the operational environment" and that this failure "led to a mismatch between forces, capabilities, missions, and goals."[3] The same report recommended that the way ahead must "develop and promote leaders who remain flexible, question existing paradigms, assume risk, and foster interorganizational

---

[1] GEN Raymond T. Odierno, "Future Vision for the Army" (lecture, Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, April 10, 2013).

[2] U.S. Department of the Army, *A Leader Development Strategy for a 21st Century Army* (Training and Doctrine Command, 2009), http://cgsc.edu/ALDS/ArmyLdrDevStrategy_20091125.pdf (accessed September 20, 2012), 1.

[3] U.S. Department of Defense, *Decade of War, Volume I: Enduring Lessons from the Past Decade of Operations* (Suffolk: Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis, Joint Staff - J7, 2012), http://server16040.contentdm.oclc.org/u?/p4013coll11,2035 (accessed March 18, 2013), 3.

1

collaboration."[4] This strategy "establishe{d} imperatives for the integration of programs, policies and initiatives to produce Army Leaders" and it described the goals or ends of leader development for the Army.[5] For the Army Leader Development Strategy to be effective it must align the necessary programs and policies to accomplish the desired goals and mitigate the troubles of the past decade.

Over the past decade, officer development has suffered because of the focus on the immediate conflicts of Iraq, Afghanistan and the broader global war on terror and because the officer management systems have not evolved to address the current needs. The complexity of the battlefields and the huge manpower requirements negatively shaped deliberate leader development processes. In a 2006 RAND study on leader development, it was clearly indicated that" (i)n selecting people for promotion and for command positions, the military system accords heavy weight to previous operational experience, and especially to previous successful command experience."[6] The senior Army major or junior lieutenant colonel that is not selected for battalion command, can rightfully question whether his failure to be selected was based on his potential and capability or his lack of opportunity to be developed for the opportunity. The focus on the ongoing conflicts, with the manning and training cycles driven by the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) cycle and manning shortfalls changing accessions numbers, assignment requirements, and promotion standards and timelines set the conditions for inadequate development opportunities. This shortfall in leader development is reflected in a number of common occurrences seen over the past decade.

---

[4]*Decade of War, Volume I*, 21.

[5]*Leader Development Strategy for a 21st Century Army*, 1.

[6]Henry A. Leonard et al., *Something Old, Something New: Army Leader Development in a Dynamic Environment* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Publishing, 2006), 53.

There were a number of commonly seen issues with officer management and leader development that drove the development of the ALDS. The large number of lieutenants accessed to address the critical shortfalls in senior captain and major grades resulted in an increase in the time before an officer could attend their initial branch training course, decreasing the amount of time a lieutenant had in a unit before the board for selection to captain. Combined with the large number of officers waiting for platoon leader slots this decreased the time available for developmental jobs and reduced platoon leader time to as short as seven months. The decrease in promotion timing for captain meant that most junior officers had very little time in a unit before being sent to the career course. For the high performing lieutenants, the opportunity to remain in a unit longer was often presented. Keeping these officers for a second ARFORGEN cycle mitigated the risk to organizations but increased the professional career risk to the officer.

After a second deployment the now junior captain had to get through the slow career course pipeline, which was inadequate for the numbers, and into a command. The earlier major's promotion boards, with extra below-the-zone categories, decreased the opportunities for the officer to take advantage of developmental opportunities. The cooperative degree programs available at a number of career courses, though beneficial to the Army, placed the individual officer at risk.[7] The officer, rushing into any command opportunity, typically struggled in command. The lack of developmental time on a battalion or brigade staff left the young officer unprepared for the complexities of command. This struggle, combined with the ARFORGEN cycle and deployments, also meant that most non-maneuver officer had numerous short evaluation periods with multiple senior raters. The adage of first impressions, and lack of earlier

---

[7]The author observed a number of engineer officer, decline the opportunity to get a master degree in engineering management because of command timeline issues. This was in spite of the clearly laid out statistics that to remain competitive as a senior engineer a master's degree was required.

development, meant a good command evaluation was mostly a matter of timing and luck.

The post command captain, looking at the back log at Fort Leavenworth, and needing to find the right job to help with promotion opportunities, was statistically going to fill an institutional job that could not mitigate the lost developmental opportunities. The now junior major, almost guaranteed with a 99% selection rate, knew he needed a key and developmental (KD) major's job to remain competitive. The tough choice, of doing it before intermediate level education (ILE) or after, and accelerated promotion timelines created further risk. Waiting until after ILE, gave the officer a better set of skills for the job, but increased the urgency to get into the job. This urgency either resulted in one of two things. The officer could miss the developmental opportunities of serving on division and brigade staff and thus not understand the commander and the organization; most likely impacting performance. The other option was to serve on the staff before the KD job, gaining experience and understanding, but potentially not having the necessary evaluations in their records before the selection boards. The officer that accepted the KD job before ILE typically struggled to operate at the field grade level and lacked the staff and organizational skills to be successful. The officer would have the necessary evaluations in his file, but chances were that they compared poorly to the officer that had attended ILE.[8] Implementing the ALDS effectively, to better prepare officers, requires the objectives of the strategy be coherently communicated throughout the Army, the programs for managing officers to be adjusted to support the strategy, and the policies that constrain the programs to be adjusted.

The effectiveness of the leader development strategy is dependent on coherent objectives

---

[8]The author personally observed the situations described in this vignette as a battalion executive officer at Fort Drum, as a battalion commander responsible for all engineer officer education and training, and as a deputy brigade commander who managed the company command and field grade slates for a five battalion engineer brigade. Anecdotally, the author has confirmed similar stories from his peers.

communicated across the developmental domains, integrated programs that support the objectives

and logical policies that enable the programs. Coherent objectives are determined by examining

the how effective subordinate organization's objectives reflect and support the higher

organizations objectives. The effectiveness of a program is based on how well the output supports

the goals and whether the actions involved in the program conflict with the desired outcomes. A

logical policy does not constrain a program from achieving the desired outcomes. The extent that

a strategy enables or forces coherent objectives, establishes programs that facilitates the desired

outcomes and is supported by policies determines the effectiveness of the strategy.[9]

ELEMENTS OF STRATEGY AND THE ARMY'S LEADER DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY

Determining the limitations on the effectiveness of the leader development strategy

requires an understanding of what a strategy is and what are the components of an effective

strategy. Because the term strategy has many nuanced meanings, it is important to define how this

term is used for this study. Dr. James B. Quinn's description of strategies for change is useful for

describing the Army's leader development strategy. "A **strategy** is the *pattern* or *plan* that

integrates an organization's *major* goals, policies and action sequences into a *cohesive* whole."[10]

Goals or objectives articulate what is to be achieved and when. Programs are the sequences of

actions or systems that achieve the goals. Policies are the guidelines and rules that establish the

limits or constraints for the programs.[11] Effective strategies, in addition to the three essential

elements of goals, programs and policies, have three other defining characteristics. First, the

strategy must be developed around a few key concepts that provide cohesion and focus. Second,

---

[9]James Brian Quinn, "Strategies for Change," in *Readings in the Strategy Process*, ed. Henry Mintzberg and James Brian Quinn (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1998), 8-9.

[10]Quinn, "Strategies for Change," 3-10. {Emphasis in the original.}

[11]Quinn, "Strategies for Change," 3-4.

the strategy must enable the organization to position itself to deal with an unknown future; specifically can the organization accomplish the goals despite unpredictable events and consequences of interactions. Thirdly, it is necessary to have a systematic method of ensuring that subordinate efforts accomplish overall strategic objectives.[12] This framework is useful for analyzing the ALDS because of the alignment of the framework terms and the organization of the officer management system's objectives, programs and policies. Because of this close alignment this description serves as a useful framework for organizing and understanding the components of the strategy and for structuring the analysis of the strategy.

From the described characteristics, three criteria were used to assess the Army's strategy. The criteria were coherency, allowing the organization to posture for the unknown, and integrated in a system that checks and/or enforces execution. These criteria are derived from characteristics above that describe an effective strategy.[13] Coherency is defined for this assessment as clearly articulated throughout the organization, logically linked or nested with the higher organization, mutually supportive of adjacent organizations. Posturing for the future is defined as providing flexibility for unknown and potential circumstances while not overly restricting the organizations ability to adjust. The system criterion is defined as a system that maintains flexibility of execution details, but reinforces the key concepts and approaches while ensuring execution occurs. These criteria were used to identify the issues in the goals, programs and policies.

According to Dr. Quinn, goals (or objectives) state what is to be achieved and when results are supposed to be accomplished. They also "establish the intended nature of the

---

[12]Quinn, "Strategies for Change," 9.

[13]Dr Quinn discusses these criteria and others in his model. Based on the three areas that are examined in this paper these criteria were selected.

enterprise and the directions in which it should move."[14] Effective strategies must have clear, decisive and attainable objectives.[15] These objectives, in mission command parlance, are "a clear and concise expression of purpose" and end state that provides focus and allows subordinates to accomplish the desired results in the face of the unpredictable.[16] The major goal of the Army's leader development strategy is to develop officers that are capable of meeting the challenges of the 21st century.[17] The supporting strategic goals are to provide leaders to the Army with specific qualities, attributes and competencies.[18] These goals are articulated through and executed within three leader development domains - the institutional, operational and self-development domains. The language used in the published ALDS is clear but given the complexity of both the requirements and the systems for execution, the objectives fail to provide the necessary coherency to enable effective execution across the domains. The strategic goals, if accomplished, will effectively posture the Army to address the future. The goals have not provided enough specificity to enable a system to check execution within the operational and self-development domains because they fail to include a defined time frame for accomplishing them. The analysis highlights elements of the strategic objectives that require change and that will support a better application of the programs and policies for successfully implementing the strategy.

Programs describe the specifics of how objectives will be achieved within the constraints of the policies. They provide the specific sequence of actions, to include the commitment of

---

[14]Quinn, "Strategies for Change," 3.

[15]Quinn, "Strategies for Change," 9.

[16]U.S. Department of the Army, *Army Doctrinal Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-0: Mission Command* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2012), 2-3.

[17]U.S. Department of the Army, *2012 Army Strategic Planning Guidance* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2012), 11.

[18]*Leader Development Strategy for a 21st Century Army*, 7- 10.

resources, for how the objectives will be achieved. [19] In the *2012 Army Strategic Planning Guidance* the specific list of actions for leader development is: train, educate and develop leaders; enhance broadening opportunities; and reinforce the profession of arms.[20] These actions are executed through the Army's officer management systems. The systems specifically examined are the assignments process and the promotion system. These systems are adequate but not optimal for achieving the objectives of the leader development strategy. These programs were evaluated using the same criteria as above: coherent, resulting posture, and is there a system to enforce. This analysis demonstrated that the limitations of and the tensions between these programs hinder the successful execution of the strategy. The limits on these programs are described by the policies.

Policies describe the boundaries for action. They are the "rules or guidelines that express the limits within which action should occur."[21] The policies for officer management are complex, hierarchical, bureaucratic, and have evolved over time. Policies, both written and unwritten, are the rules and guidelines that define the limits of the programs or action.[22] The Army's policies, externally directed and internally developed, shape the execution of the programs for the strategy. The sheer number of policies and regulations prohibit a comprehensive review of all of them, but from analyzing the programs' effectiveness in achieving the objectives a number of policies that limit the strategy are identified. The key policies that limit the strategy are the U.S. Code on officer strengths and promotions, and the cultural norms (unwritten policy) on the identification of success. Identification of these limiting policies allowed an evaluation of whether the policy

---

[19]Quinn, "Strategies for Change," 3.

[20]*2012 Army Strategic Planning Guidance*, 11.

[21]Quinn, "Strategies for Change," 4.

[22]Quinn, "Strategies for Change," 4.

should be changed or whether the programs should be adjusted. Analysis of the officer management programs exposes a number of policies that detrimentally limit the accomplishment of the objectives.

The effectiveness of the ALDS is limited by the issues with the objectives, programs and policies. Based on these limitations a conceptual framework that adjusts elements of the officer management is proposed. This proposal directly links promotions and professional military education (PME), ties specific attrition goals to the process, and establishes accountability of unit and self development programs to the evaluators of the officers. This recommendation accomplishes the strategic goals while adhering to the leader development imperatives. It also postures the Army to account for future complexity and uncertainty while establishing a system to check subordinates' efforts and ensure they are fulfilling the objectives of the strategy.

GOALS, OBJECTIVES AND ENDS

> The paramount requirement for the Army is to develop leaders comfortable in making decisions without perfect information in any situation, including highly complex and dangerous environments. These same leaders must also be capable of training Soldiers to be adaptive, professional and disciplined in order to execute any mission. Leader development is the best means to ensure the Army can adapt to whatever an uncertain future may bring.
>
> *-2012 Army Strategic Guidance*

The Army Leader Development Strategy's stated mission is to "educate, train, and provide experiences to progressively develop leaders to prevail in full spectrum operations in a 21st century security environment and to lead the Army Enterprise." [23] This mission is reinforced in the 2012 Army Strategic Planning Guidance that articulates that developing leaders to meet the challenges of the 21st Century is one of the imperatives for the US Army to be successful in this

---

[23]*Leader Development Strategy for a 21st Century Army*, 6.

decade and beyond.[24] In order for the strategy to be effective, Dr. Quinn argues that all related efforts must be "directed toward clearly understood, decisive, and attainable goals".[25] Though these statements are clear as strategic goals the extent to which these goals shape subordinate unit goals and are communicated across the organization determines how coherent they are. The objectives must "provide continuity and cohesion for tactical choices during the time horizon of the strategy".[26]

The execution of the ALDS occurs in three domains: institutional, operational and self-development.[27] For the strategy to be effective it must provide coherent objectives across all domains and for all subordinate elements that are responsible for execution. A coherent objective is an objective that is clearly articulated and communicated across the organization, results in subunit objectives that are nested with the higher objective and that mutually support the other organizations efforts to accomplish the higher objective. The organizational objectives are found in the published missions, manuals and regulations of the organizations and their various subordinate units. This criterion is evaluated by examining the critical regulations, manuals and published guidance that shape the domain. By reviewing theses documents and identifying where they either support or contradict the ALDS objectives, the coherency of the objectives can be determined across each domain.

The institutional domain is predominantly the realm of professional military education and is controlled by the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). Within TRADOC, the responsibility of execution follows the chain of command through the Centers of Excellence, the

---

[24]*2012 Army Strategic Guidance*, 6.

[25]Quinn, "Strategies for Change," 9.

[26]Quinn, "Strategies for Change," 9.

[27]*2012 Army Posture Statement*, Addendum M, 1.

School Commandants, to the course directors.[28] Examining the Army and TRADOC regulations on professional military education and the missions and local guidance at the centers of excellence and schools and comparing them to the ALDS objectives reveals that there is general coherency through the domain. This linkage to the ALDS increases the effectiveness of the strategy, but it is not replicated in the other domains.

The operational domain is the realm of unit experiences. "Leaders are in the operational domain whenever/wherever they are not assigned as a student," therefore a unit's leadership is responsible for leader development within the operational domain. [29] Forces Command (FORSCOM) is the major command responsible for the majority of non-deployed units. The leader development responsible runs through FORSCOM to the corps, divisions, brigades and battalions. Analysis of the regulations and published guidance shows a lack of coherency between the objectives of ALDS and the objectives across the operational domain. This lack of nested objectives limits the effectiveness of the strategy. The operational domain accounts for an officer's most significant leader development experiences and this lack jeopardizes the overall strategy, however, only the self-development domain covers an officer's entire career.

The self-development domain is not tied to an assignment. It covers an officer's entire career. The individual officer "must take the initiative to gain knowledge and experience for the next level of assignments and responsibilities."[30] The Army regulation on training and leader

---

[28] U.S. Department of the Army, "Command Overview - Brief," U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, http://www.tradoc.army.mil/FrontPageContent/Docs/Command%20Brief_SEPT12.pdf (accessed April 9, 2013).

[29]*2012 Army Posture Statement*, Addendum M, 2

[30]U.S. Department of the Army, *Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management*, Pamphlet 600-3 (Washington, DC: 2010), 56.

development clearly assigns responsibility to the leader for the self-development domain.[31] The Army regulations and manuals, along with support products published by the U.S. Army's Human Resource Command and TRADOC's Center for Army Leadership provide guidance to the individual officer. This guidance is haphazard and incoherent. The lack of clear objectives for self-development undermines the effectiveness of the ALDS. The effectiveness of communicating the strategic objectives across all of the domains is determined by examining the pertinent missions, priorities and publications that describe or support execution within the domain and compare with the strategic level documents that describe the leader development strategic goals.[32] The institutional domain is the best example of how coherent the objectives should be across the Army.

Institutional Domain

The strategic goals of the ALDS are generally coherent throughout the institutional domain. TRADOC as the designated Army lead for the ALDS has communicated the objectives thru the schools and centers responsible for professional military education. The subordinate organizations have incorporated the objectives and concepts into their individual missions and campaign plans. These objectives are also reflected in the specific courses that address officer development. The institutional domain effectively supports the ALDS by coherently linking subordinate organization's objectives to the strategy's objectives.

TRADOC has clearly communicated the Army's strategic goals in the *TRADOC*

---

[31]U.S. Department of the Army, *Army Training and Leader Development*, Army Regulation 350-1 (Washington, DC: 2011), 94.

[32]The key strategic level documents are the Army's Leader Development Strategy 2009, the 2012 Strategic Planning Guidance, the 2012 Army Posture Statement, the series of Articles written by GEN Dempsey when he was the CG of TRADOC, the recently published doctrinal manuals ADP 6-22, ADRP 6-22, ADP 7-0, ADRP 7-0, ADP 6-0, ADRP 6-0; Army Regulation 350-1 and DA PAM 600-3.

Regulation 350-70, Army Learning Policy and Systems.[33] This regulation informs the Centers of

Excellence and the school commandants about the objectives for the leader development strategy

and links these objectives to specific institutional objectives as articulated in the Army Learning

Concept for 2015. [34] There is a logical hierarchy of nested objectives from the Army level,

through TRADOC to the individual schools. The Maneuver Center of Excellence first priority is

to "develop and implement a maneuver leader training and education strategy to develop agile

adaptive leaders, committed to the Army Profession, who possess the knowledge, skills, abilities,

and attributes to be successful on complex battlefields."[35] This clearly is nested with and

reinforces the Army Strategic Planning Guidance which states that "leadership development and

training must inculcate the ideals of the Professions of Arms, while preparing Soldiers and

Civilians to operate independently in more dynamic environments."[36] Reviewing the priorities of

the other Centers of Excellence shows similar nesting of objectives and reveals that the goals are

understood and are shaping subordinate organizations efforts. [37] Finally, the program of

instruction development across the centers demonstrates the mutual support across the TRADOC

organization and the institutional domain. The division of instructional topics by proponents

[33]U.S. Department of the Army, *Army Learning Policy and Systems*, TRADOC Regulation 350-70 (Fort Eustis: Headquarters, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2011), 22-23.

[34]U.S. Department of the Army, *Army Learning Policy and Systems*, TRADOC Regulation 350-70 (Fort Eustis: Headquarters, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2011), 23.

[35]"Who We Are," U.S. Army Maneuver Center of Excellence, http://www.benning.army.mil/WhoWeAreFull.html (accessed December 20, 2012).

[36]*2012 Strategic Planning Guidance*, 11.

[37]The Maneuver Support Center of Excellence, the Sustainment Center of Excellence, Fires Center of Excellence and the Mission Command Center of Excellence all have nested priorities.

insures that each course and school is supported by the remainder of the TRADOC organizations.[38] The strategic objectives of ALDS are clear throughout the institutional domain. TRADOC's objectives are nested with the Army's objectives and the subordinates within TRADOC have objectives that are coherent and support TRADOC and the ALDS.

A clear example of the coherency of the strategic goals across the institutional domain is the nesting of objectives from ALDS through the TRADOC chain of command to the Engineer Captains Career Course. The TRADOC *Strategic Plan* reflects the ALDS with the identified key tasks of developing "agile and adaptive leaders who thrive in complex, uncertain, and changing environments" and educating "agile Soldiers, leaders, and versatile units adaptable to any operational environment through lifelong learning." [39] The Maneuver Support Center of Excellence's campaign plan highlights as a key task the requirement to "[d]evelop leaders who are flexible and adaptable in the operating environment...[a]ggressively pursue and enable our branches to implement the Army Leader Development Strategy, Army Training Concept, Learning Concept 2015 and the Operational Environment."[40] The Engineer Regiment and School campaign plan has a specific line of effort for developing engineer leaders. This line of effort captures the critical objectives from the ALDS.[41] Efforts to enhance engineer leaders' core

---

[38]A specific example that highlights this is the development of Counter-Improvised Explosive Device training that is part of all Career Courses; the training is developed by the Maneuver Support Center of Excellence and exported to the other schools. The author was personally involved in course development for the Engineer Basic Officer Leadership Course and the Engineer Captains Career Course. Both efforts involved working with proponents to integrate their training into the engineer courses.

[39]U.S. Department of the Army, *TRADOC Strategic Plan* (Fort Eustis: Headquarters, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2012), 4.

[40] U.S. Department of the Army, "MSCoE OPORD, 11-16, Maneuver Support Center of Excellence (MSCoE) Campaign Plan (CP) Fiscal Years 2011-2012." (Fort Leonard Wood: Headquarters, Maneuver Support Center of Excellence, 2011), 3. (In author's collection.)

[41]*Leader Development Strategy for a 21st Century Army*, 8. Specifically the strategy

proficiencies, solving the commanders technical problems and/or solving his tactical problems using technical means, are reflected in the decisive points of expanding technical skill identifies, integrating professional certifications, expanding technical cooperative degree opportunities and redesigning the career course. The broadening objective is directly tied to the Joint Engineer Operations Course and also to the cooperative degree program linked to the career course. Redesigning of the officer courses, based on the Army Learning Concept, drives the curriculum to expand cultural awareness and creative and critical problem solving.[42] The school's campaign plan is directly reflected in the Captains Career Course curriculum and instructional methodology. Instead of focusing on declarative knowledge, the program of instruction focuses on problem solving with context rich scenarios.[43] The thread of linked objectives from the ALDS to the course is also mirrored in the other schools and centers of excellence. While the institutional domain has propagated the strategic objectives through the organizations and this increases the effectiveness of the overall strategy, this is not the case for the other domains.

<div align="center">Operational Domain</div>

Leader development in the operational domain is the responsibility of unit commanders. The Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Army in their posture statement to congress explain that "(c)ommanders are charged with developing leaders to operate effectively

---

seeks to deliver leaders who are competent in their core proficiencies, broad enough to operate with a global mindset across the spectrum of conflict, able to operate in a JIIM environment, can operate and provide advice at the national level, culturally astute, willing to see and exploit opportunities in the complex environment and grounded in Army Values.

[42]Department of the Army, *USAES Campaign Plan Update* (Fort Leonard Wood: Headquarters, U.S. Engineer School, 2012), https://www.blackboard.wood.army.mil/Vids/BG_DeLuca/ (First accessed 5 November 2012)

[43]The author was the battalion commander responsible for the engineer captains career course and worked directly with the course manager to implement and resource the redesigned program of instruction.

at the next level of responsibility and preparing leaders to attend their next level of PME."[44] The

leader development programs within the operational domain are guided by doctrinal publication,

Army regulations and organization guidance documents. Examination of the linkages from the

Army's strategy through these publications reveals a lack of coherency for the objectives.

The language in the Army strategy is very precise and prescriptive. The ALDS

"prescribe{s} how we develop leaders grounded in tactical and operational art."[45] However, the

Army regulation on training and leader development (*AR350-1*) and the Army pamphlet on

officer professional development and career management (*DA PAM 600-3*) utilize a more

descriptive language and change the objectives from required to desired. In the officer

professional development section of *AR 350-1* it repeatedly uses the phrase "commanders

should."[46] This language change dilutes the effectiveness of the strategy.

Forces Command (FORSCOM), as the responsible headquarters for most non-deployed

operational units, fails to reinforce the objectives of ALDS. In the 60-pages of the *FORSCOM

Campaign Plan 2011-2015,* the only paragraph on leader development is focused on habitual

command relationships to address appropriate supervision responsibilities:

> Develop Soldiers and Leaders. The Army must technically and tactically develop
> Soldiers and leaders, and continue to develop future senior leaders, while expanding
> training focus on FSO. To strengthen appropriate mission command, mentorship, and
> leader to led responsibilities, we will reestablish the habitual relationships of our
> formations within the requirements of ARFORGEN and COCOMs, yielding trained and
> ready units to support FSO.[47]

The failure to specifically address objectives of the ALDS could be inferred to mean that leader

---

[44]*2012 Army Posture Statement*, Addendum M, 3.

[45]*Leader Development Strategy for a 21st Century Army*, 14.

[46]*Army Training and Leader Development*, 94.

[47]U.S. Department of the Army, *U.S. Forces Command Campaign Plan 2011-2015*, (Fort
McPhearson: Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces Command, 2010), 15.

development is primarily handled in the institutional domain. The ALDS identifies leader

development in operational units as essential, but if the leader development objectives are ignored

by organizational guidance the effectiveness of the strategy for the Army is significantly

degraded.

Also, despite the Army Posture Statement, charging commanders to develop leaders for

their next level of responsibility, the primary training regulation (AR 350-1) directs commanders

to only develop leaders for increased responsibilities "once they are confident that leaders can

perform mission essential tasks to standard."[48] This contradicts the imperatives described in the

ALDS that place equal weight on broadening leaders to understand the context of operations as it

does on technical and tactical competence.[49] With the focus of leader development shifting "to

broaden leaders beyond their demonstrated competency in irregular operations to achieve

proficiency in full spectrum operations," the language of AR 350-1 impedes the nesting of

subordinate goals and limits the overall coherency of the strategy.[50] The doctrinal manuals for

training and leader development (ADP 7-0 and ADRP 7-0) describe generalities for commanders

on the concepts of leader development but do not significantly clarify the specific objectives

associated with the leader development strategy. The doctrine states the leader needs to be

developed in terms of the leader attributes and competencies through jobs, training and education,

but provides no details to accomplish this. While this reflects the language of the strategy, the

source document for what the jobs should be and what experiences an officer should have is DA

Pamphlet 600-3. This pamphlet provides a laundry list of should-have jobs and should-be-able-to-

---

[48]*Army Training and Leader Development*, 93-94.

[49]*Leader Development Strategy for a 21st Century Army*, 3- 6.

[50]*Leader Development Strategy for a 21st Century Army*, 7.

do skills.[51] The limitations of these structured career maps will be discussed later. The bottom line is the ALDS' objectives are poorly clarified in the operational domain and the multiple references with imprecise language hinder the effective execution of the strategy.

<p style="text-align:center">Self-Development Domain</p>

Self-development is defined in the *Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management* pamphlet (*DA Pam 600-3*) as "a goals-based, feedback-driven program of activities and learning that contributes to professional competence, organizational effectiveness, and professional development."[52] The aggressive goals of the ALDS are not effectively or coherently communicated to the officer corps. The sources for guiding self-development are overly simplistic and narrowly focused. The objectives and goals are poorly nested with the objectives of the ALDS and they do not account for the complex operational environment the Army expects.

There are four primary sources for guidance on self-development for army officers. The first source is *Army Regulation 350-1* and *Department of the Army (DA) Pamphlet 600-3* (quoted above). *AR 350-1* provides general guidance on the role of self-development as it relates to training and leader development. Specifically, it states that self-development will "assist individuals with their current assignment and prepare them for future assignments...bridge the gaps between the operational and institutional domains... (and) set the conditions for continuous learning and growth." [53] This is the extent of the regulation's discussion on self-development. *DA Pamphlet 600-3* attempts to provide guidance for each rank and branch, the general nature of the

---

[51]*Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management*, Multiple sections address this by branch..

[52]*Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management*, 2.

[53]*Army Training and Leader Development*, 6.

guidance provides little focus or clarity. As an example, aviation captains are counseled to

understand aviation and combined arms operations and to "broaden their understanding of

warfighting specificity is the norm for the pamphlet though some of the technical branches

provide more details on certifications and educational objectives. The ALDS is broader and

simultaneously more demanding in the details. Junior leaders "will gain an increasingly more

sophisticate understanding of geo-politics, culture, language, and information operations and in

the process, through extension courses and independent study."[54] This inadequate level of

recognize and manage the strategic impact that they and their units can influence."[55] This level of

specificity is lacking in all of the examined regulations and administrative publications.

The second source and the one with the least amount of explanation, is the training and

leadership doctrinal manuals. *Army Doctrinal Publication (ADP) 6-22, Army Leadership* and

Army Doctrinal Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-22, Army Leadership, provide little guidance

and only indicate that self-development is a necessary part of leader development.[56] The training

doctrine, *ADP 7-0* and *ADRP 7-0*, provide some guidance on the relationship of the commander

to an officer's efforts in self-development. "They help subordinates recognize their individual

strengths and weaknesses, encouraging and supporting individual self-development programs."[57]

But neither document serves as effective guidance for the officer looking to establish a personal

---

[54]*Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management*, 83.

[55]*Leader Development Strategy for a 21st Century Army*, 12.

[56] U.S. Department of the Army, *Army Doctrinal Publication (ADP) 6-22: Army Leadership* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2012), 17 and *Army Doctrinal Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-22: Army Leadership* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2012), 7-1.

[57] U.S. Department of the Army, *Army Doctrinal Reference Publication (ADRP) 7-0: Training Units and Developing Leaders* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2012), 1-2.

self-development program. The ALDS provides very specific guidance on development goals.

> Our junior leaders must achieve and sustain mastery of mission essential weapons, equipment and systems. In addition, junior leaders must achieve competence in the conduct of combined arms operations supported by joint fires and information engagement. They apply troop leading procedures to guide their units in employment of tactics, techniques and procedures specific to assigned missions roles and functions. These junior leaders will understand and employ principles of staff coordination across JIIM boundaries. They must remain current as information technology advances. They will gain an increasingly more sophisticated understanding of geo-politics, culture, language, and information operations and in the process, recognize and manage the strategic impact that they and their units can influence. We want our junior level leaders to anticipate transitions within tactical operations and act upon opportunities. We want these leaders to create climates that support our warrior ethos and Army values, develop subordinate leaders, build teams, and inspire their Soldiers to service. [58]

This type of language could be clearly expressed in the training and leadership doctrine and would reinforce the strategic objectives.

The third source for guidance is the various handbooks and products available through the Center for Army Leadership. The fourth source is the new Army Knowledge Online My Training portal. The two products from the Center of Army Leadership that address self-development are the Self-Development Handbook and the Army Leader Self-Development Reference Guide. The first is focused at the junior leader level, but it provides a solid framework for self-assessment and to identify self-development objectives.[59] The second document is a list of internet links to resources provided by the Army "to assist leaders with the domain of self-development by identifying and locating relevant military resources."[60] The My Training portal

---

[58]*Leader Development Strategy for a 21st Century Army*, 12.

[59]*Army Handbook for Self-Development* (Fort Leavenworth: Combined Arms Center—Center for Army Leadership, n.d.), pageNr., http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/CAL/resource-library.asp (accessed January 28, 2012).

[60]*Army Leader Self-Development Reference Guide* (Fort Leavenworth: Combined Arms Center—Center for Army Leadership, n.d.), http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/CAL/resource-library.asp (accessed January 28, 2012).

offers two sources to assist in self-development. The first is the professional development career maps. By selecting their branch, the officer is taken to a site that lists recommendations for and requirements by each grade. The self-development sections provide recommended reading lists, civilian education and certifications. The specificity of the recommendations is limited. For example, a field artillery captain is provided the following recommendations: get a graduate degree, read the Chief of Staff of the Army's reading list, read the Center of Military Histories reading list, read ADP 6-22, study a foreign language, do the Multi-Source Assessment Feedback, and continue to develop Field Artillery Technical and Tactical Skills.[61]   Though these are important, the disconnection between this list and the language in the ALDS is striking. Both the resources from the Center for Army Leadership and the internet training portal provide solid resources. They do not provide clear and coherent objectives.

The recognition that self-development is a critical portion of leader development is clearly conveyed through the strategic level documents. The language describing the importance of self-development is reflected through lower level documents, but it is not refined with sufficient details to provide guidance to officers to enable them to make the effective decisions. The ALDS describes very specific objectives for developing adaptable and innovative leaders, but the limited guidance provided does not facilitate execution in the operational domain.

The current doctrine on training and leader development emphasizes that officer development "is a continuous and progressive process, spanning a leader's entire career."[62] The average time spent in professional military education programs is only about 11.5% of an officer's

---

[61]"Field Artillery Officer Professional Career Map" My Training portal, Army Knowledge Online,   https://ile.atsc.army.mil/pdmPublic/pdm/officer/branch13/13A.html (accessed 20 December 2012).

[62]*Army Doctrinal Reference Publication (ADRP) 7-0: Training Units and Developing Leaders*, 1-2.

career.[63] This means that 88.5% of an officer's development occurs in the operational and self-development domains. For the Army's strategy effectively to grow leaders who can, as the initial epigraph states, "out-think and out-innovate adversaries" it should not be limited to the institutional domain.[64] The strategy has only provided coherent goals within the institutional domain. Within the operational and self-development domains, the objectives are not as coherent.

PROGRAMS

> Which brings me to the third and greatest challenge facing your Army, and frankly, my main worry. How can the Army break-up the institutional concrete, its bureaucratic rigidity in its assignments and promotion processes, in order to retain, challenge, and inspire its best, brightest, and most-battled tested young officers to lead the service in the future?
>
>   - Secretary Of Defense Robert M. Gates, West Point, NY,
>   February 25, 2011

The Army's doctrinal publication on leadership, *ADP 6-22 Army Leadership*, states that "leader development involves recruiting, accessing, developing, assigning, promoting, broadening, and retaining the best leaders, while challenging them over time with greater responsibility, authority and accountability."[65] The degree to which these programs reinforce the ALDS determines how relevant the programs are and whether they have adapted to support the Army's objectives. The two programs examined here are the assignment system and the

---

[63]The education courses for officers include Basic Officer Leadership Course - average 18 weeks, the Captains Career Course - average 21 weeks, Intermediate-Level Education (resident) - 41 weeks and Senior Service College - 40 weeks. This gives a total of 120 weeks over a 20-year career (1040-week career) which is only 11.5% of a career. Officers that attend SAMS for the second year (additional 40 weeks) spend 15.4% of their career in institutional education programs. Numbers are from the Army Training Requirements and Resource System course catalogues. https://www.atrrs.army.mil/atrrs2.aspx

[64]Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), *National Military Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: 2011), 16.

[65]*Army Doctrinal Publication (ADP) 6-22: Army Leadership*, 9.

promotion system.[66] As reflected in the epigraph, these systems impede the execution of the Army Leader Development Strategy.

The Army has developed, with congressional involvement, complex systems and programs to execute these tasks. Specifically, according to a Defense Science Board report, "these processes remain fully deliberate, constrained by layers upon layers of review and concurrence, fed by additional layers of supporting personnel to create a hierarchy wholly disconnected from the current operational tempo."[67] Additionally, the huge personnel requirements for the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq were met "at the expense of education and broadening assignments, thus eviscerating critical windows of officer developmental timelines."[68] Both the assignment process and the promotion system, each a very bureaucratic system, limit the effectiveness of the ALDS. How these programs limits the effectiveness of the ALDS is critical to understanding the limitations of the strategy.

The assignments process does not effectively match talents to missions or specific jobs. It does position officers so that they have an opportunity to get key jobs that will enable their promotion. At the branch assignment officer level, within the flexibility the bureaucracy affords them, individual officers can be assigned to locations and jobs they prefer. What the system does not support is a dynamic matching of skills to unit or location specific requirements. This type of

---

[66]The recruiting and accessing programs are focused on finding talent and bringing that talent into the force. These programs have not been examined in this paper because the interaction of ALDS with these programs exceeds the scope of this paper.

[67]U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense For Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, *Enhancing Adaptability of U.S. Military Forces*, *Defense Science Board Report* (Washington, DC: 2011), 20.

[68]Thomas Boccardi, "Meritocracy in the Profession of Arms," Military Review, January-February 2013, 18.

management does not routinely occur until the senior officer level.[69] According to a former assignments officer, the assignment system is split focused on providing personnel to units (by numbers and grade) and making sure each officer is positioned to serve in jobs necessary for promotion.[70] The system is not designed nor focused on placing officers where their skills or expertise can best serve the Army or an organization. This limitation within the assignment process also impacts the effectiveness of the promotion system.

The promotions system also fails to support the leader development strategy. The lack of objective standards tied to the ALDS, a pattern of promotions that are contrary to the stated objectives and the lack of a means to check that the system supports the overall strategy impedes the Army's development strategy. The primary consideration for promotion is an officer's evaluations. The officer evaluation is a subjective assessment and fails to provide the details on skills, experience and true competencies necessary to promote the best officers. Additionally, the system forces a strict career path that limits the development of officers. Operational assignments lead to promotion and promotion leads to command which allows the possibility of future promotions. The lack of flexibility in the system undermines the strategic objectives of the ALDS.

<center>Assignments</center>

The U.S. Army Human Resources Command (HRC) describes their mission as the execution of career management, sustainment, distribution, and transition of personnel to optimize personnel readiness and enable leader development.[71] This process of assigning

---

[69]LTC (P) John Buck, Senior Leaders Division, Former Engineer Branch Majors and Lieutenant Colonels assignment officer , Leavenworth, KS, January 31, 2013.

[70] LTC (P) John Buck.

[71]"HRC Mission and Vision," U.S. Army Human Resources Command Website, https://www.hrc.army.mil/STAFF/HRC%20Mission%20and%20Vision (accessed January 22,

personnel to positions that not only will develop the individual officer but increase the capabilities of the officer corps is critical for the Army to posture for future uncertainty and is one of the ALDS's imperatives.[72] However, the assignment system gives limited flexibility to match talent to job requirements.[73] The system fails the coherency criteria because the system is not logically nested, nor does it support effectively other organizations development strategies (having the right officers with the right skills), and it is not conceptually linked to the ALDS. The system does result in the officer corps having a capability to address future uncertainty, but it is more a result of Darwinism then it is deliberate development.[74] Also, there are no checks or enforcement systems in place. A gaining organization can accept the inbound officer or risk not being filled with the necessary personnel. The assignment process, tied to quantitative requirements, does not support the ALDS.

Personnel assignments are driven by requirements. A former quartermaster career manager stated it best when he wrote, "Above all else, the reason for making an assignment is to fill a valid Army requirement. In fact, according to AR 614–100, Officer Assignment Policies, Details, and Transfers, assignments involving permanent change-of-station moves are authorized only when required by national security or to ensure equitable treatment of soldiers."[75] Though

---

2012).

[72]*Leader Development Strategy for a 21st Century Army*, 11.

[73]Scott M. Halter, "What Is an Army but Soldiers?" *Military Review*, January-February 2012, 17.

[74]Darwinism is the theory of evolution by natural selection of those species best adapted to survive the struggle for existence. In this context, the traits that allow an officer to succeed in a job are not deliberately developed; those officers that have them get promoted and those that don't fail. Sometimes the traits that enable success are only useful in a very specific environment and the selection of these officers spreads traits that are harmful to the army. Examples include most toxic leadership traits.

[75]Gary A. Marquez, "The Officer Assignment Process," Army Logistics University,

HRC discusses leader development as part of the assignment considerations, the reality of the process is based on numerical methods. As units identify vacancies or projected losses, the assignment officers conduct a scrub of the officer population to determine who is available to fill the position.[76] This pool of available officers is then screened for eliminators: missing professional military education courses, hardship or personal factors (dual military, exceptional family members, and other compassionate consideration), overseas or deployment equity, and potential to accomplish required key and developmental positions.[77] The final pool of available officers is then compared to the officer's personal preferences.[78] This methodology typically reduces the options for the assignment officer to only a couple of officers, making the assignment process a matter of who is available, not who is best for the job.[79] This does not facilitate the matching of jobs (and the specific skills, expertise, experiences needed) with a specific officer.[80]

---

http://www.almc.army.mil/alog/issues/JanFeb04/Officer_Assignment_Process.htm (accessed January 30, 2012).

[76]*Engineer Branch Brief - Active Component* (Fort Knox: Engineer Branch, 2012), https://www.hrc.army.mil/Officer/Engineer%20Officer%20Welcome%20Page (accessed December 19, 2012). Referred to as a YMAV scrub, or a Year/Month Available to Move - based on defined career progression models - selection for promotion to captain, completion of the Career Course, completion of company command, etc.

[77]Marquez, "The Officer Assignment Process."

[78]AR 614-100 specifically lists: (1) the officer's grade, career fields, education, and experience. (2) The professional development needs of the officer.(3) Availability. (4) Policy considerations, such as PCS costs, stabilization, and tour equity. (5) Officer's potential for advancement. (6) Personal preferences of the officer or family considerations, for example, exceptional family member program (EFMP), and concurrent assignment of family members to the same military unit. (7) Regimental affiliation. (8) Location and date of projected command selection list (CSL) command as Project/Systems Manager. Education and experience is tied to military education level and specified jobs, not skills.

[79]LTC Michael Anderson, interviewed by author, Fort Leavenworth, KS, January 8, 2012.

[80]Halter, "What Is an Army but Soldiers," 18.

"Instead, after commissioning and throughout their careers, each officer is viewed as being made of the same clay."[81] With the exception of nominative positions and senior officers, according to author Tim Kane, "(j)ob assignments, which cause the most heartburn among officers, are managed by a faceless, centralized bureaucracy that keeps everyone guessing about where he or she might be shipped next."[82] The language, in the regulations that govern assignments, refers to leader development and mirrors the objectives from the ALDS. However as COL Susan Lawrence, former Signal Officer Branch Chief explained, "Professional development is primarily a timing issue; understanding the timeline and assignment cycles, as well as knowing your goals, will enable you to better manage your career."[83] The conflicts over the past decade have exacerbated the problem because "the wartime environment's insatiable personnel demands caused current theater needs and future developmental needs to diverge."[84] This conflict between the ALDS objective of utilizing assignments as a means to develop officers and the practical application of assigning based on numerical requirements results in the strategy being undermined by the program. The limitation of the assignment process to deliberately enable officer development also jeopardizes the ALDS concept of broadening officers.

The linkage or causation between broadening assignments and the development of adaptive leaders is implied but not proven. As early as 1960, Morris Janowitz discussed the

---

[81]Casey Wardynski, *Towards a U. S. Army Officer Corps Strategy for Success: Developing Talent (Officer Corps Strategy Monograph Series, Volume 5)* (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2010), 19.

[82]Tim Kane, *Bleeding Talent: How the Us Military Mismanages Great Leaders and Why It's Time for a Revolution* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), (Kindle Locations 555-556)

[83]Susan Lawrence, "The Officer Assignment Process: Separating Fact from Fiction," Army Communicator, http://www.signal.army.mil/ocos/ac/Edition,%20Fall/Fall%2000/ofcrasgn.htm (accessed Dec 12, 2012).

[84]Boccardi, "Meritocracy in the Profession of Arms," 17-23.

linkage between prescribed career paths and success as compared to unique assignments and innovation. His conclusion was that it was the character of the officer that self-selected unique assignments, understanding the risk to their career, rather than the actual uniqueness of the assignment that predicted the capability for innovation and adaptability.[85] The current process of managing assignments does not facilitate the development of an innovative and adaptable officer corps and it limits the opportunities for individual officers that would self-select non-traditional assignments.

The assignment system has no method to enforce the developmental objectives. Once an officer is assigned to a unit or an organization, the personnel managers can see where an officer is assigned but have no authority to force a specific utilization. Though a unit can request an officer with specific skills or expertise, they get whatever officer is available that meets the base requirements, unless the skill is tied to a rank, branch or an army skill identifier and built in the authorization documents.[86] This lack of a forcing capability reinforces the perception by officers that the army does not do "a good job matching talents with jobs."[87]

The outcome of the strict templates, limited opportunities for broadening assignments and a numerical based assignment process hinders the accomplishment of the ALDS. There are

[85]Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: a Professional and Political Portrait* (United States: Free Press, 1960) 11 and 171.

[86]Halter, "What Is an Army but Soldiers," 17. Provides an anecdote for this in his article based on correspondence with COL Casey Haskins. "When the Multi-National Force-Iraq commander provided a detailed proposal for the fielding of military transition teams in Iraq, he included broad definitions for the personnel requirements. For instance, the rank of the logistics advisor could range from sergeant first class through captain, but the individual had to be someone who understood and could train the Iraqis on battalion sustainment. That allowed the Army to fill the slot with a supply sergeant, a transporter, an infantryman who had been an S4, or support platoon leader. The Army (G1, G8, and G3) immediately rejected the flexibility, insisting they could not manage like that. The requisition did not match the requirements system."

[87]Kane, *Bleeding Talent*, (Kindle Location 1947).

innovative and adaptive officers, with non-standard career paths, that are successful (i.e. GEN Petraeus), but the majority of brigadier and major generals are successful because they followed the defined career path of operationally focused assignments. [88] The argument that because there are successful and innovative officers that are products of the current system, the system must support the strategy is a false one. According to Dr. Quinn's model, "the fact that a strategy worked in retrospect is not a sufficient criterion for judging any strategy."[89] The success of individuals is not sufficient proof that a system that is expected to develop thousands of officers works.

Promotions

The promotion system is supposed to "Identify and advance officers with the appropriate skills, experience, competencies, manner of performance and demonstrated potential to meet Army requirements."[90] As a stated purpose it is nested with the Army Leader Development Strategy but does not fully address the defined requirements based on the operational environment. The problem with the system is that it has no objective means to determine if the officers considered for promotion have the appropriate skills, experience, competencies or potential. The lack of objective measures prevents the program from coherently supporting the strategy. The required attributes and competencies are currently only measured subjectively and therefore the system is not conceptually faithful to the desired outcome of the strategy.

---

[88]See Appendix A. Analysis of all currently serving active duty brigadier and major generals reveals the overwhelming pattern of command type assignments in operational units during deployments. The ratio of command assignments while deployed to staff jobs while deployed is approximately 1.27 to 1. When normalized based on length of time spent in command jobs versus staff jobs during a career the ratio is approximately 3.63 to 1.

[89]Quinn, "Strategies for Change," 9.

[90]U.S. Department of the Army, *Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management*, Pamphlet 600-3, 10 (3-1.e.).

Additionally the promotion system, because it fails to support the strategic objectives, results in the Army not being as effectively postured for the future. Finally, the system of checks and enforcement that exists is focused on fairness not on accomplishing the strategic objectives. The system does not does not check or force the process to only promote qualified personnel. The system works, but does not support ALDS and in actual execution impedes the effectiveness of the strategy.

The organization responsible for the promotion program, U.S. Army Human Resource Command explains that "(t)he basic concept of the promotion selection system is to select for promotion those officers who have demonstrated that they possess the professional and moral qualifications, integrity, physical fitness, and ability required to successfully perform the duties expected of an officer in the next higher grade."[91] The ALDS is focused on growing leaders that demonstrate the attributes and competencies for service at an officer's current and future grade.[92] A promotion board determines which officers are best qualified to serve at the next grade. These boards consider a limited number of factors: an officer record brief, evaluation reports, awards and decorations, an official photograph, college transcripts, and any derogatory information in the officer's files to make the decision.[93] The fidelity of the data and the implicit meaning of the data shapes the results of the promotion board.

The officer record brief (ORB) is a snapshot of an officer's career that provides general data on previous deployments, assignments, language proficiency, schools attended, awards,

[91]"Officer Promotions Article - Centralized Army Officer Promotion System," U.S. Army Human Resource Command Website, https://www.hrc.army.mil/TAGD/Centralized%20Army%20Officer%20Promotion%20System (accessed March 31, 2013).

[92]*Leader Development Strategy for a 21st Century Army*, 8.

[93] "Board Preparation Checklist," U.S. Army Human Resources Command Website, https://www.hrc.army.mil/TAGD/Board%20Preparation%20Checklist (accessed April 9, 2013).

security clearance, and basic physical health standards. The ORB provides very little explicit information for directly assessing an officer. Implicitly, the accuracy and completeness of the ORB is used to gage the professionalism of the officer and certain indicators can be used to assess the officer. The sequence of positions held, lack of certain schools associated with positions, the lack of certain awards (change of station or deployment) are some of the indicators, but they are implied and very subjective. These nuanced assessments are shaped by the reviewing officer's cultural norms and experiences. The experiences that allow a board member to identify implied qualities from the data also potentially limit the effectiveness of selecting officers that have capabilities needed for the future because they are not explicitly identified. The same limitations apply to the use of the officer evaluations.

The most heavily weighted items considered in a promotion board are the written evaluations. The evaluations have only two objective assessments: height/weight and a pass/fail on the physical fitness test. The forced distribution and block checks, though masked in numerical methods, are entirely subjective. Some evaluators will establish personal objective standards as part of their rating philosophy, but the Army has none.[94] The goal of the ALDS is to develop leaders who are competent in their core proficiencies, but the promotion system only considers subjective assessments on that competence. Author Tim Kane highlighted these flaws in "the biased nature of top-down evaluations that skewed promotions, not to meritorious behavior aimed at productivity or mission, but that support the immediate rater in the chain of command."[95] The promotion system is not capable of discerning and selecting the officers that meet the qualities framed in the ALDS. It is only capable of selecting the officers that are presented, through

[94] An example of objective standards the author has observed include: writing assignments, timeliness standards for administrative actions (evaluations, awards, etc), counseling records completeness, supply accountability, and maintenance standards.

[95] Kane, *Bleeding Talent,* (Kindle Locations 1912-1913).

subjective evaluations, as meeting those standards. This disconnect reveals the lack of coherency between the promotion system and the ALDS.

The Army Leader Development Strategy and the Army Strategic Planning Guidance emphasize the requirement for adaptable and innovative officers, who have a perspective "broad enough to operate with a global mindset and across the spectrum of conflict."[96] As part of this requirement is the increased emphasis on broadening assignments. The results of recent promotion boards, if the system supported the objectives of the ALDS, would show an increase in the number of officers selected having non-traditional or broadening assignments. An analysis of the biographies of all current active duty Brigadier Generals and Major Generals does not reflect the broadening expected.[97] The opposite is true. Very few broadening assignments occurred prior to the rank of colonel. Less the 9% of the generals studied attended non-army command and staff courses. Only 13% attended non-basic branch advanced courses. While only 10 (3.8%) attended non-war college fellowships, with 60 (22.6%) having had joint experiences before lieutenant colonel. The most common denominator of these officers is command in combat.[98] The ALDS theory is that the current and projected operational environment requires officers to be specifically developed (broadened) to be successful. There are three possible explanations for this incongruence. First, broadening does increase success and the selection process for Colonels, Brigadier Generals and Major Generals from 2003 to 2012 have not selected the best qualified for

---

[96]*2012 Strategic Planning Guidance*, 11. and *Leader Development Strategy for a 21st Century Army*, 8.

[97]See Appendix A.

[98]See Appendix A. Leadership combat tours equaled 427, staff combat tours equaled 336. Assuming normal career paths leadership time was approximately 7 years and staff time was approximately 19 years. When normalized based on time the ratio was 3.63 to 1 leadership tours to staff tours.

the future.[99] Second, broadening is not necessary for success but can increase the capabilities of individual officers. Third, broadening hinders selection for promotion, but key leaders need broad staff officers to support their organization. Because of the assignment limitations described in the previous section, there is a risk that the officer corps will believe the third option.[100] Until the promotion results indicate broadening increases the potential for promotion it will not be an effective objective in posturing the Army for future conflicts. The 2012 Army Posture Statement submitted to Congress states that the Army "will continue to adjust in order to prepare our leaders for more dynamic and complex future environments."[101] The current promotion system has not yet adapted and currently does not support the ALDS which impedes the posturing of the Army for future complexity. [102]

The bureaucratic process of the promotion system has checks for equity (race, color, creed, and congressionally mandated assignments) but does not have any checks for effectiveness. The responsibilities of senior raters of officers are described in Army Regulation 623-3.

> Senior raters or reviewing officials use their positions and experiences to evaluate the rated Soldier's performance and/or potential within a broad organizational perspective, military program of instruction, or civilian academic course standards. The senior rater's

---

[99] Not the opinion of the author, just a possible option to explain the incongruence.

[100]Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier,* Chapters 5-8. Professor Morris Janowitz discussed the tendency for most officers to follow the prescribed career path and how the system rewards them for doing so. He also discussed the career risks associated with the officers that sought unique assignments.

[101]U.S. Department of the Army, *A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army 2012*, by John M. McHugh, 112th Cong., 2d sess., Report (Washington, DC: 2012),11.

[102] The recent changes to the Officer Evaluation system attempts to provide refined assessments to the boards to facilitate the selection of the best qualified officers. The changes will provide a more clearly stratified ranking, which will facilitate the selection process. The Evaluation is still limited by the fact it is still only subjective data masked as objective, by using quantitative forced distribution, in the author's assessment.

evaluation is the link between the day-to-day observation of the rated Soldier and the longer term evaluation of the rated Soldier's potential by HQDA selection boards.[103]

The officers fulfilling this role are tasked with making sure the promotion process can select those officers that can best serve the Army's mission. The regulation specifically states that this "responsibility is vital to the long-range success of the Army's mission."[104] The regulation further prohibits specific items from being addressed in an evaluation and through the referral process ensures the rated officer is aware of potential derogatory information. However, the only check on the senior rater is the forced distribution of officers they have rated. This forced distribution is entirely subjective. The effectiveness of an officer's evaluations is never checked and the officer is never held accountable for their recommendations.[105] At the local level, if the senior rater disagrees with the rater, they can discuss their observations, but the senior rater cannot direct the rater to change the evaluation.[106] The senior rater can use the observation to form their evaluation of the rater but cannot specifically reference the flawed assessment. This is also not an effective check or enforcement of this critical system. Because there are not specific controls the Army has to depend on every rater being competent to effectively assess an officer against the future needs of the Army and every rater doing the right thing for the Army every time. This discounts the reality of the normal bell curve of competence and professionalism that exists in every

---

[103]U.S. Department of the Army, *Evaluation Reporting System*, Army Regulation 623-3 (Washington, DC: 2012), 16.

[104]U.S. Department of the Army, *Evaluation Reporting System*, Army Regulation 623-3, 26.

[105]Anecdotally the author has been told that at the senior level (LTC, COL) boards that who the rater and senior rater are is at times more important than the words used. Two identical evaluations can be assessed differently based on the reputation of the evaluators. This, however, is different from being held accountable for the evaluation.

[106]This is an important protection and there is no implied recommendation by the author to change this.

population.[107] The promotion system, directly tied to the evaluation system, does not check or enforce the strategic objectives of developing the necessary capabilities identified in the ALDS.

The promotion system does not effectively support the objectives of the Army Leader Development Strategy. The lack of objective evaluation criteria tied to the Army's strategic objectives for developing leaders hinders the system in selecting the adaptable and innovative officer required. This failure to specifically promote officers that demonstrated the articulated attributes and competencies potentially fails to posture the Army for the future operational environment. Finally, the lack of a system to check and hold officers accountable for their evaluations and recommendations, results in the outcome being happenstance rather than a deliberate outcome of a program to accomplish a strategic objective. The promotion system has selected competent officers, but it does not support the strategic objectives of the ALDS.

POLICIES

> The one Army system that affects every single Soldier, his or her family, and defines the arc of their life in uniform is The Personnel System. It's been largely untouched and unreformed by the longest war in the nation's history. Changing it in ways that do not flip over the apple cart in the midst of two wars is no small task.
>   - Lieutenant General David Barno, U.S. Army, ret, 21 January 2011

The officer management systems limit the effectiveness of the Army Leader Development Strategy because of the constraints of policy. The policies that control these systems limit the Army's ability to adapt them to accomplish the objectives of the development strategy. The primary written policy limitations are the U.S. Code, Title 10 Chapters 32 and 36. These laws prescribe the size of the officer corps and specifically limit the numbers of officers by grade. They also direct very specific timelines for selection and promotion of officers. These

---

[107]This is accepted by the army as seen by the distribution method imposed by the evaluation system.

inflexible prescriptions limit the Army's ability to manage assignments and promotions to support the requirements of the force and the requirements for developing officers.

The second key limitation is the unwritten cultural norms that define success and limit advancement to a narrow field of officers. This field of officers follow a strict career path and limit broadening assignments that might put them at risk for promotion.. The selection of officers for promotion is conducted by a diverse board of senior officers (senior to the officers considered). This diversity is expected to prevent a narrow body of officers from being selected. Critiques of the process indicate that though the board may be demographically diverse the patterns of selection are culturally predictable, as explained by COL Thomas Boccardi.

> The legacy of war intensified an existing cultural trend of muddy-boots experiences, skewing selection practices in favor of combat-centric assignments. Over the last two years, all infantry battalion commander-selects averaged 36 months in key developmental assignments as a major and 36 months as a captain, with just fewer than four percent having a joint duty assignment. Few had any assignment outside of the BCT; in fact, the most common broadening assignment was aide-decamp. The scope of time demonstrates the disparity, as officers in each grade-plate served upwards of 80 percent of their developmental time within the BCT.[108]

The limitations of these policies constrain the programs by preventing the organization from adjusting timelines and the number of officers by grade to address requirements and this hinders the accomplishment of the ALDS objectives because the needs of the operational army compete with the leader development requirements and the policies do not allow the programs to minimize the impacts of the competition. The most inflexible policies are the legislative restrictions placed by Congress in the U.S. Code.

US Code

Chapter 32, Title 10 of the U.S. Code prescribes officer strength and distribution in grade. Specifically it prescribes the authorized numbers of officers in the grades of Major, Lieutenant

---

[108]Boccardi, "Meritocracy in the Profession of Arms," 19.

Colonel and Colonel as a portion of the total authorized strength of the officer corps.[109] From a purely budgetary perspective, it makes sense to limit the number of senior officers within the organization. From an organizational perspective, the challenge is the inflexibility of balancing officer development with operational requirements as described by COL Thomas Boccardi. "Brigade combat team-centric assignments became a valuable commodity for selection; hence, those in older year groups failed to rotate out of the BCT. The resulting effect prevented an opportunity for junior officers to move up. In some cases, 25 to 30 percent of the officers in older year groups filled company command and brigade level staff positions."[110] The requirement to get experience and demonstrate competency in key jobs (platoon leader, company command, Ss, Executive Officer); makes the competition for those job extremely high. The large number of officers needing the jobs conflicts with the requirement to hold the job for a long time to be competitive for promotion. This results in only some officers having the opportunity. The shortfalls in officer strength and the lack of flexibility to man institutional training organizations or placing officers in developmental programs forces the assignment process to relay on automated and numerical based systems to solve the hard math problem. When operational demands increase, for example training teams and theater specific headquarters, the flexibility decreases further and reduces any efforts to match specific talents to jobs an anomaly. Colonel Casey Wardynski, in his Officer Corps Monograph Series argues that "{o}nly when officer requirements and inventory align closely... can the Army meet operational demands without sacrificing talent development."[111] This has been demonstrated by the large numbers of colonels

---

[109]Officer Strength and Distribution in Grade, codified at U.S. Code 10 (2011), Chapter 32 § 523.

[110]Boccardi, "Meritocracy in the Profession of Arms," 19.

[111]Wardynski, *Towards a U. S. Army Officer Corps Strategy for Success: Developing Talent (Officer Corps Strategy Monograph Series, Volume 5)*, 7.

that deferred attendance at the war college during the past decade.[112] The legislative control of numbers and timelines results in gaps in either development or in operational capability that cannot be mitigated internally to the Army.

The more restrictive portion of the U.S. Code is Chapter 36 of Title 10. This chapter prescribes very specific timelines for the selection and promotion of officers. "Because of the strict timetable, promotion requires key assignment milestones to be achieved and "checked off" within each competitive occupation."[113] This checklist approach to assignments, driven by the cohort management approach to promotion timelines, means that development in the operational domain is limited because of accelerated rotations through key jobs.[114] The specified zones of promotion are directed to be established by seniority.[115] There is some flexibility in the law, but the service implementation of the law removes any potential flexibility by using very specific time in grade standards to determine the zones of promotion.[116] These strict timelines with the law specifying that "An officer of the Army or Air Force who on the day before the effective date of this Act [Sept. 15,1981]—''(1) holds the regular grade of first lieutenant, captain, or major; and ''(2) has twice failed of selection for promotion to the next higher regular grade, shall, unless continued on active duty under section 637 of title 10, United States Code, as added by this Act, be retired, if eligible to retire, be discharged, or be continued on active duty until eligible to retire

---

[112] Deferral was so prevalent that the U.S. Army directed that no colonel would be slated for command without attendance, or being scheduled to attend before assumption of command. MILPER 12-305.

[113]Kane, *Bleeding Talent,* (Kindle Locations 2439-2440).

[114]Halter, "What Is an Army but Soldiers," 19.

[115]Peter Schirmer et al., *Challenging Time in DOPMA: Flexible and Contemporary Military Officer Management* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Publishing, 2006), 10.

[116]Schirmer, *Challenging Time in DOPMA,* 10.

and then be retired, under the laws in effect on the day before the effective date of this Act."[117]

Because selection for promotion requires key jobs, the constant movement of officers to ensure

everyone has an opportunity to get those jobs, decreases the ability to develop the officer corps.

This approach to officer management is more designed to be fair; everyone gets a chance, than it

is designed to get the right talent to the right job. Based on his analysis, Tim Kane posits that

"{t}he officers who prefer to specialize are effectively punished and forced to retire for getting

off-track."[118] The ALDS is focused on getting the right development to the right officer, followed

by the right officer to the right job. The current law and the policies that support it prevent the

flexibility to accomplish the strategic objectives.

<div align="center">Cultural Norms</div>

Cultural norms, the unwritten policies, limit the effective execution of the ALDS as much

as the formal rules do. The decision by GEN Casey to disapprove the promotion board results for

selection to Brigadier General in the 2008 and recall General Petraeus from Iraq to chair the

board is acknowledgement that the unwritten standards have limited the process of selecting

adaptive officers required by the Army.[119] The implication was that a number of senior colonels,

that had direct positive impacts on changing the course of the war in Iraq, were passed over for

promotion because they did not have the right career benchmarks.[120] The impact of cultural bias

also directly impacts the value placed on developmental assignments. LTG David Barno in a

---

[117]Promotion, Separation, and Involuntary Retirement of Officers on the Active-Duty List, codified at *U.S. Code* 10 (2011), Chapter 36, § 611.

[118]Kane, *Bleeding Talent,* (Kindle Locations 2448-2449).

[119]Kane, *Bleeding Talent,* (Kindle Location 3050).

[120] The truth to the specifics of the decision will mostly have to wait until General Casey publishes his autobiography after leaving the service.

2011 warning to the then new Army Chief of Staff put it in these terms.

> Refine the Army Culture. The Warrior Ethos and Army Values remain spot on. The evolution of two armies -- the (hooah) operating force and the (wimpy) generating force -- does not. NCOs and officers are not "taking a knee" when they serve in TRADOC, the Pentagon, or study their profession. Two big wars over ten years have gutted the respectability of service outside of the line (not to mention military intellectualism) by heroically valuing "gunfighters" above those serving in the rest of the force. Education today simply does not matter in the Army's "down range" culture. Plenty of well-meaning generals have fueled this disastrous corrosion. Restoring professional thinking, writing, education and developmental assignments to the forefront of what it means to be a Thinking Warrior has to start now. Civilian grad school, mandatory career-long resident education, and developmental tours for NCOs and all grades of officers are a must....War is a thinking man's -- or woman's -- business.[121]

These norms are difficult to pin down, because they are primarily identified through demographic trends and historical analysis. Additionally, for each trend identified, a counter-point case study can be presented to "disprove" that it is a cultural norm.

As a specific case, the language of the Army Strategic Planning Guidance on broadening lends one to the expectation that leaders that had a broader assignment background adapted faster to the operational environment in Iraq and have been promoted because of this success. A survey of Brigadier and Major Generals' résumés shows that this is not true.[122] The officers selected followed typical career paths with the most common characteristic being commanding on combat. The efforts to address this by GEN Casey impacted a single board, the statistics and expectation is "the core system remains firmly in place and it is more likely than not to lapse into habits set by the unreformed rules of the game."[123]

---

[121]David Barno, "Dave Barno's Top 10 Tasks for General Dempsey, the New Army Chief of Staff," The Best Defense, entry posted January 21, 2011, http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/01/21/dave_barno_s_top_10_tasks_for_general_dempsey_the_new_army_chief_of_staff (accessed September 15, 2012).

[122] See Appendix A. The majority of the broadening assignments occurred at the war college or afterwards.

[123]Kane, *Bleeding Talent,* (Kindle Locations 3056-3057).

The policies that shape officer management, both written and unwritten, do not effectively support the strategic objectives of the Army Leader Development Strategy. The prescribed officer strengths and promotions timelines drive an inflexible and mathematical assignment process that fails to match talents with jobs. The same timelines result in promotion of officers with a narrow band of competence. Compounding the problem is the unwritten cultural norms that establish a very limited definition of success and limit the inclusion of broader officers to the upper ranks. The lack of officers with a broader perspective undermines the objectives of the strategy and hinders the adaptation of the Army to address the future security environment.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The lack of coherency of the strategic objectives, the limitations of the officer management systems and constraints of the policies can be addressed through an officer management strategy that will enable the Army Leader Development Strategy. The recommended strategy addresses the critical limitations.

The essential elements of the proposal include linking attendance to institutional education with selection for promotion, empowering unit commanders to determine attendance priority and sequencing, linking graduation with promotion, resetting cohort year groups based on graduation dates, and establishing a senior rater graduation profile. Critical to this strategy will be changing select policies and laws to enable increased flexibility in managing officers

Initial officer accessions and training would remain the same as currently executed. Following the current time in grade standards promotion to 1LT remains a decentralized decision. Selection for promotion to captain occurs as currently executed, based on a time in grade standard; however the numbers selected would be based on a fully qualified standard. Tied to this selection is the authorization to attend the career course. Actual attendance will be determined by the senior rater based on an assessment of the officer's preparedness for the course. The officer

will remain a 1st Lieutenant (Promotable) until he graduates the career course. The Academic Evaluation Report banding for the officer (Exceeded Course Standards, Achieved Course Standards, Marginally Achieved Course Standards, and Failed to Achieve Course Standards) would then be added to a profile on the Senior Rater who validated and approved the officer's attendance. Academic attrition rates and course sizes (for the fiscal year) would be scaled to reduce the fully qualified numbers to the authorized best qualified requirements for the year. A directed attrition rate (i.e. the bottom 10%) can be used to increase rigor. The officer would then be promoted the day of graduation and the cohort year group would be reset based on the graduation date and course rank. Additionally, the evaluation standards within the course can provide specific skills data to the assignment managers and a gaining unit's leadership. This data can support talent matching of officers to jobs. The same process would occur after selection for promotion to major. The captain(promotable) would be sent to the command and general staff college after being validated and approved by their senior rater and would be promoted to major upon graduation from the course. Again the cohort year group would be reset upon graduation. The same banding for academic success would be reflected on a senior rater's profile.

The rational for each of the above steps is tied to correcting the current limitations of the officer management systems. In reverse order, the post-schooling assignment process can use the feedback from the adaptive learning programs (grades, electives taken, assessment models of interests and skills) to match officers with jobs. This talent assessment can be executed more effectively in the institutional environment because officers can be evaluated by experts in each field, as compared to by a rater/senior that may only have expertise in limited areas. As an example, the engineer officer, with a civil engineering degree, who performs very well in the construction sections of the course, has completed his cooperative degree in engineering management and his Professional licensing as an environmental engineer is probably a good fit for the Mississippi Engineer District. The engineer officer, with a history degree, and who

performed marginally in the construction portion of the course, is most likely a poor candidate for

the same job. The key is to improve the assignment process by matching officers with jobs. This

requires more than the current officer record brief covers.

> Unfortunately, this is simple *accounting* data. To manage officer talent, however, the
> Army needs *decision support* data, *information that reveals what makes each officer tick.*
> What does he value? What opportunities does he desire? What incentives will he respond
> to? What does he know that the Army has not taught him? Where has he been that the
> Army has not sent him? What does he enjoy? How does he see the future? How does he
> learn? In other words, what are his (or her) talents? [124]

The matching of officers to specific jobs that match their talents and interests will increase the

capabilities of the organizations, restore trust in the educational institutions, and increase career

satisfaction for the officer corps.

The resetting of the cohort year group upon graduation extends the time before an officer

is considered for promotion again. This allows ample time for the officer to complete

developmental and broadening jobs without being disadvantaged by previous delays. Currently,

officers that do broadening assignments (advanced civil schooling, teach at West Point, joint

assignments, etc) are rushed to complete the necessary developmental jobs before consideration

for promotion. This rush forces the officer and their units to quickly rotate officers through

positions, hindering the experiential learning and disrupting the effectiveness of the organization.

This reset stabilizes officer management and reduces turmoil. It also gives senior raters the

freedom to actually develop officers prior to key and developmental jobs without disadvantaging

the long term career options.

Promotion upon graduation from the professional military education course (either the

career course or ILE) adds very objective evaluation criteria to the promotion process. Currently

---

[124]Casey Wardynski, *Towards a U.S. Army Officer Corps Strategy for Success:
Employing Talent Volume 6* (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2010), 9.

selection for promotion is based on a ranking of subjective assessments.[125] The concept of a board

of examination or a test for promotion is certainly not new.[126] This effectively links the

institutional development with the operational development and provides an objective validation

of an officer's capabilities. Currently the performance of an officer in their professional military

education courses has little to no bearing on their success.[127] Yet, the Army's strategic assessment

of the future operational environment demands "entrepreneurial leaders with a broad perspective

and a diverse range of skills."[128] These broadening perspectives and skills are developed in the

institutional domain and are the focus of TRADOC's Army Learning Concept 2015. This has

always been the role and value of the military educational schools as highlighted by studies on

successes in American wars. "The ability of future commanders and general staff officers to

adjust to new situations was based on the principles of military problem solving as taught at

Leavenworth."[129] The military profession, and advancement in that profession, should be tied to

certification and objective validation. Finally, the rank will now be tied to capabilities that have

---

[125]Similar to polling, sufficient quantities of subjective assessments can begin to assume the qualities of objective data. However, promotion boards do weight specific evaluations greater than others (command) and use the pattern of performance as only one metric.

[126]The U.S. Army utilized Boards of Examination to evaluate for promotion in 1865. A review of *The 1865 Customs of Service for Officers of the Army* lists written examinations for promotion.

[127]MG Richard P. Mustion, "The New Officer Evaluation Reports" (lecture, School of Advanced Military Studies, Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, November 2012).- During a question and answer session following his brief on the new officer evaluations, he acknowledged that the Academic Evaluations have no weight and do not influence promotions or selections significantly.

[128] U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), *A Speech As Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, West Point, NY*, by Robert M. Gates, Speech (West Point, 2011).

[129]Peter J. Schifferle, *America's School for War: Fort Leavenworth, Officer Education, and Victory in World War II* (Lawrence: Univ Pr of Kansas, 2010), 69.

been validated.

The linkage of the Academic evaluation report to the validating senior rater serves as both a check on and a forcing function for leader development in the operational domain. Currently a senior rater can highly recommend an officer for promotion with no consequence if the officer is unable to perform at that level. The responsibility of the unit commander to develop his subordinates is already enshrined in the regulations and doctrine, but is not enforced. An observed trend is the marginal officer that is sent to school to get them out of a unit before a critical mission or deployment.[130] Instead of developing the officer, school is seen as an easy way to remove the less capable officer from a unit.[131] This feedback system provides a direct incentive for unit commanders to train and validate their officers before they are sent to school.

The yearly course load tied to a specific attrition process allows the Army to balance the required population of officers. As an example, if the Army requires 1000 infantry captains for the coming year, the career course can be allocated the seats to accomplish this mission. The school can plan on five classes, each capable of teaching 225 students. The last class of the year is sized to account for failures during the previous classes and delayed attendees.

The decision of when to send an officer to school and the flexibility to increase time on station for officers that require further development and to reward high performing officers is critical. Frequently, when a unit was preparing for deployment, commanders sent low performing officers to school and kept higher performing officer for the deployment. This was often at the

---

[130]Observed by the author as a battalion commander of the engineer career course (2009-2011) and as an instructor in the career course (2002-2004).

[131]The author, when instructing at the engineer career course, noticed a pattern between officers that were failing and the unit they came from. The author and another instructor started keep statistics on the units and the success rate of their officers. The author was later given a direct order to destroy the data and to never discuss the specific observations on the units and their commanders.

cost of the officer's career timeline and potential broadening opportunities. With promotion being contingent upon graduation, keeping the high performing officers would be the same as denying promotion. Tied to this decision making was an unstated expectation that the officer that would fill the hole may not be qualified (because clearly they would not have been sent to school if they were good). The paradigm would change with this system. Commanders would fight to get their best officers to school as early as possible as a reward and would develop aggressive development programs to prepare officers for success at school. Also, officers that were not interested in fast tracking could ask to stay or accept broaden jobs before attending school. Because of the year group reset, an officer could go to school a couple of years after his original peers attended and still be competitive for future opportunities. As an example, an engineer battalion commander could have four 1st Lieutenants that have been selected for promotions. One is a top performer and wants to command, one is a good performer, but was only recently moved into a company XO position and is missing some critical experience, another is a good performer but would like to have an opportunity to work with the local Corps of Engineers Office doing project management, and the fourth officer is an average performer. The commander can send the first officer to the career course immediately. The second officer can be scheduled for later in the year. The third officer can be reassigned to the Corps office and the commander there can revalidate and send the officer later. The final officer remains in the unit and is given further developmental tasks. The senior commander at a unit or installation can provide oversight to ensure that officers are not unfairly penalized. Specifically, does the commander have an effective development program and have officers been counseled on the assessments and decisions. This works even better at the CPT(P) level, because of the larger number of developmental opportunities and the time commitment necessary. The ability to spend two years in a PhD program with a utilization tour and still be able to compete effectively with his peers as a major is critical and supports the conceptual framework of the ALDS.

46

A centralized selection board would still be used to select for promotions, (except for 2LT to 1LT). This provides an unbiased screening system and accounts for changes in raters and senior raters during the course of an assignment.

The proposed changes to the officer management system combined with ability to reset cohort year groups provide more developmental opportunities and increases the capabilities of the officer corps. Currently, the officer that shows up to a unit after attending the Basic officers course, airborne school and ranger school (with one or two recycles) may only be a 2nd Lieutenant for a couple of months. Utilizing decentralized authorities the commander can extend the developmental time for the officer without permanently penalizing the officer's career. A captain that spends two years on staff then commands a company for two years, with two of these years deployed, can still seek broadening experiences without opting out of commanding at the battalion level. Secretary Gates highlighted the concerns of officer during a speech at the Military Academy when he said, "They talked about finding respite from the deployment treadmill, getting an opportunity to start or re-acquaint themselves with their families, to develop themselves intellectually through graduate education or other non-conventional assignments."[132] This system allows this to occur without losing quality officer because of a bureaucratic machine.

CONCLUSION

The Army Leader Development Strategy seeks to adapt the Army so that the development of leaders postures the Army to handle the uncertainty of the future operational environment. The effectiveness of this strategy is tied to the coherency of the objectives, the

---

[132] U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), *A Speech As Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, West Point, NY*, by Robert M. Gates, Speech (West Point, 2011).

integration of the programs and the support of the policies. The coherency of the objectives is critical across all domains of leader development. At this time, the institutional domain has effectively integrated the objectives across the center of excellence and the schools. In the operational domain, the objectives are communicated, but are not a coherent part of guiding leader development. Within the self-development domain, again the intent is communicated, but the guidance provided to officers is general and not nested with the objectives of the overall strategy. The two critical programs are the assignment system and the promotions process. Both programs hinder the execution of the current strategy. The assignment process is bureaucratic and quantitatively focused. Despite the best efforts of career managers little, if any, talent matching occurs during the process. The promotion system also hinders the strategy, by forcing a check the block career progression that favors a very narrow career path. The policies that shape the programs also limits the effectiveness of the strategy. The US Code that prescribes officer strength and promotion timelines, limit the flexibility of the Army to accomplish both operational missions and develop officers. The unwritten policies reinforce the bad practices of the promotion system, by narrowly defining success and punishing officers that follow non-standard careers. The adaptation of the Army is critical for the security of the United States. To accomplish the adaptation the policies and programs need to be changed and the objectives need to permeate all three developmental domains.

APPENDIX A: GENERAL OFFICER STATISTICS

These numbers were generated by examining all of the published resumes listed for active duty Brigadier and Major General officers, as listed on the General Officer Management Office. Each biography was examined and the data was tabulated in a spreadsheet. A numerical analysis of the tabulated was then conducted with the results captured below. Special branch (Chaplains, JAG Officers, and Medical Officers) were excluded from the detailed analysis.

	Numbers	% of Total Population	
Total GO's Examined (Active Component BG & MG)	289		
Total GO's (Excluding Special Branches)	266		
COL(P)	22	7.6%	
BG (Frocked)	11	3.8%	
BG	137	47.4%	
MG	119	41.2%	
Rank on 9/11/2001			
MAJ	47	16.3%	
LTC	207	71.6%	
COL	35	12.1%	
Branch Demographics (Basic)	289	100.0%	
Infantry	96	33.2%	
Armor	25	8.7%	
Field Artillery	24	8.3%	
Aviation	22	7.6%	
Engineer	20	6.9%	
Quartermaster	16	5.5%	
Air Defense	11	3.8%	
Signal	11	3.8%	
Military Intelligence	11	3.8%	
Ordnance	7	2.4%	
Chemical	6	2.1%	
Adjutant General	5	1.7%	
Military Police	5	1.7%	
Transportation	4	1.4%	
Finance	3	1.0%	
Special Branches (JAG, Chaplain, MS)	23	8.0%	Excluded From Further Analysis

		Based on 266 GO's (Total - Special Branches)	
Number that Attended other than Basic Branch CCC/Advance Course (Excludes Branch Xfer/Branch Detail Officers)	35	13.2%	
# Infantry that went to other OAC/CCC	15	5.6%	
# Infantry that went to other OAC/CCC (excluding Armor)	4	1.5%	
# Branch Xfer	14	5.3%	
# Xfer to Aviation (Prior to being a Branch)	13	4.9%	
# xfer to Acquisitions	8	3.0%	
# SF Assessment Xfer	13	4.9%	
# SF Assements (Non-IN)	2	0.8%	

# Attended Non-Army CGSC	23	8.6%	
Naval Command and Staff	13	4.9%	
Air Command and Staff	4	1.5%	
Marine Command and Staff	3	1.1%	
Canadian Land Forces Staff College	2	0.8%	% of Non-Army CGSC
# Infantry That went to NonArmy CGSC	7	2.6%	30.4%

# Attended SAMS	24	9.0%	% of SAMS Pop
# Infantry that Attended SAMS	10	3.8%	41.7%

# that did not Go To The Army War College (Other War Colleges and Fellowships)	140	52.6%	
# Attended Non-Army War College	105	39.5%	% of Peers
# Major Generals	37	13.9%	31.1%
# Brigadier Generals	58	21.8%	39.2%
# COL(P)	10	3.8%	45.5%
# that were MAJ on 9/11	22	8.3%	
# that were LTC on 9/11	79	29.7%	
# that were COL on 9/11	5	1.9%	
# Attended Non-Army War College (excluding NWC & ICAF)	41	15.4%	
Air War College	8	3.0%	
Naval War College	28	10.5%	
National War College	*34*	12.8%	
ICAF	*30*	11.3%	
JAWS - NDU	2	0.8%	
Marine War College	2	0.8%	
Australian Defense College	1	0.4%	% of Pop at Non AWC
# Infantry NON-Army War College	34	12.8%	32.4%

50

SSC Fellowships	35	13.2%
# Major Generals	13	4.9%
# Brigadier Generals	20	7.5%
# COL(P)	2	0.8%
Harvard	7	2.6%
University of Texas	7	2.6%
CIA	4	1.5%
MIT	3	1.1%
Stanford	2	0.8%
US Institute of Peace	2	0.8%
AOASF	1	0.4%
Center for New America Security	1	0.4%
University of Denver	1	0.4%
Georgetown	1	0.4%
Institute for World Politics	1	0.4%
Naval Post Graduate	1	0.4%
Post Graduate Intel Program	1	0.4%
London	1	0.4%
Switzerland	1	0.4%
Tufts	1	0.4%
# Infantry Fellowships	14	5.3%

# Other Fellowships (non-War college)	10	3.8%
Congressional Fellow	2	0.8%
Legislative Fellow	1	0.4%
White House Fellow	1	0.4%
Brookings	1	0.4%
Post grad Intel Program	1	0.4%
Research Fellow	1	0.4%
JFK-Harvard	1	0.4%
Strategic Fellow	1	0.4%
Council on Foreign Relations Fellow	1	0.4%

Command Tours in Combat	427	160.5%
(Includes - Platoon Leader, Co CDR, BN CDR, BDE CDR or equivalents)		
Zero Times	64	24.1%
One Time	85	32.0%
Two Times	63	23.7%
Three Times	35	13.2%
Four Times	13	4.9%
Five Times	4	1.5%
Six Times	2	0.8%
Seven Times	1	0.4%
Nine Times	1	0.4%
Eleven Times	1	0.4%

Staff Tours in Combat	336	126.3%
(Includes - Co XO, BN Staff, BDE Staff, Directors, Aides, Division Staff(CSL Staff included), Analyst)		
Zero Times	65	24.4%
One Time	120	45.1%
Two Times	52	19.5%
Three Times	22	8.3%
Four Times	8	3.0%
Seven Times	2	0.8%

Neither Staff Nor Command Tour	20	7.5%	
# with no deployment that are Acquisition or Contracting	7	2.6%	
Other Functional Areas (Space, Info Sys, Defense Attache, ORSA)	6	2.3%	
# Basic Branch with no deployments as O6 or lower	7	2.6%	1/3/3 MAJ/LTC/COL on 9/11

Avg Promotion to BG (TIS)	27
Time CMD Positions (avg)	7
Time in Staff Positions (avg)	20
CMD Combat Tours	427
AVG CMD Cbt Tours	1.6
AVG CMD Cbt Tours/Avg years of CMD	0.23
Staff Combat Tours	336
Avg Staff Cbt Tours	1.3
Avg Staff Cbt Tours/avg years of Staff	0.06
Ratio of CMD/yr to Staff/yr	**3.63**

Personal Assistants		
# Aide de Camp	53	19.9%
# Aide more than once (Subset of Above)	7	2.6%
# Military Assistant	18	6.8%
# MA more than once (Subset)	1	0.4%
Exec to General Officer	54	20.3%
Exec to Senior Civilian	18	6.8%
# Exec more than once (subset)	9	3.4%
Military Aide to POTUS/VPOTUS	2	0.8%

Other Trends		
Ranger Regiment Assignments	20	7.5%
Infantry Basic Branch #	16	6.0%
Once	9	3.4%
Twice	7	2.6%
Three	0	0.0%
Four	3	1.1%
Five	1	0.4%
Assignment Officer/Branch	24	9.0%
Once	18	6.8%
Twice	6	2.3%
Language Skills	33	12.4%
One	26	9.8%
Two	3	1.1%
Three	2	0.8%
Four	2	0.8%
# that are MI	1	0.4%
# that are SF	4	1.5%
Observer/Controller	16	6.0%
USMA Instructor/TAC	9	3.4%
Joint Assignments Or Fellowships Before O5	60	22.6%
one	58	21.8%

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Barno, David. "Dave Barno's Top 10 Tasks for General Dempsey, the New Army Chief of Staff." The
    Best Defense. Entry posted January 21, 2011.
    http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/01/21/dave_barno_s_top_10_tasks_for_general_demps
    ey_the_new_army_chief_of_staff (accessed September 15, 2012).

"Board Preparation Checklist." U.S. Army Human Resources Command Website.
    https://www.hrc.army.mil/TAGD/Board%20Preparation%20Checklist (accessed April 9, 2013).

Boccardi, Thomas "Meritocracy in the Profession of Arms." *Military Review*, January-February 2013.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). 2011 *National Military Strategy of the United States of
    America*. Washington, DC, 2011.

Engineer Branch Brief - Active Component. Fort Knox: Engineer Branch, 2012.
    https://www.hrc.army.mil/Officer/Engineer%20Officer%20Welcome%20Page (accessed
    December 19, 2012).

"Field Artillery Officer Professional Career Map" My Training portal, Army Knowledge Online,
    https://ile.atsc.army.mil/pdmPublic/pdm/officer/branch13/13A.html (accessed 20 December
    2012).

Halter, Scott M. "What Is an Army but Soldiers?" *Military Review*, January-February 2012.

"HRC Mission and Vision." U.S. Army Human Resources Command Website.
    https://www.hrc.army.mil/STAFF/HRC%20Mission%20and%20Vision (accessed January 22,
    2012).

Janowitz, Morris. The *Professional Soldier: a Professional and Political Portrait*. New York: Free Press,
    1960.

Kane, Tim. *Bleeding Talent: How the US Military Mismanages Great Leaders and Why It's Time for a
    Revolution*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.

Lawrence, Susan. "The Officer Assignment Process: Separating Fact from Fiction." Army
    Communicator. http://www.signal.army.mil/ocos/ac/Edition,%20Fall/Fall%2000/ofcrasgn.htm
    (accessed Dec 12, 2012).

Leonard, Henry A., Craig S. Moore, Ronald E. Sortor, Michael J. Polich, and Jeffrey Peterson. *Something
    Old, Something New: Army Leader Development in a Dynamic Environment*. Santa Monica, CA:
    Rand Publishing, 2006.

Marquez, Gary A. "The Officer Assignment Process." Army Logistics University.
    http://www.almc.army.mil/alog/issues/JanFeb04/Officer_Assignment_Process.htm (accessed
    January 30, 2012).

Mustion, MG Richard P. "The New Officer Evaluation Reports." Lecture, School of Advanced Military
    Studies, Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, November 2012.

Odierno, GEN Raymond T. "Future Vision for the Army." Lecture, Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, April 10, 2013

"Officer Promotions Article - Centralized Army Officer Promotion System." U.S. Army Human Resource Command Website. https://www.hrc.army.mil/TAGD/Centralized%20Army%20Officer%20Promotion%20System (accessed March 31, 2013).

Quinn, James Brian. "Strategies for Change." In *Readings in the Strategy Process* 3rd ed, edited by Henry Mintzberg and James Brian Quinn, 3-10. Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1998.

Schifferle, Peter J. America's School for War: *Fort Leavenworth, Officer Education, and Victory in World War II*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2010

Schirmer, Peter, Harry J. Thie, Margaret C. Harrell, and Michael S. Tseng. *Challenging Time in DOPMA: Flexible and Contemporary Military Officer Management*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Publishing, 2006.

U.S. Department of the Army. *2012 Army Strategic Planning Guidance*. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2012.

_____. *A Leader Development Strategy for a 21st Century Army*. Training and Doctrine Command, 2009. http://cgsc.edu/ALDS/ArmyLdrDevStrategy_20091125.pdf (accessed September 20, 2012).

_____. *Army Doctrinal Publication (ADP) 6-0: Mission Command.* Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2012.

_____. *Army Doctrinal Publication (ADP) 6-22: Army Leadership.* Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2012.

_____. *Army Doctrinal Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-22: Army Leadership*. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2012.

_____. *Army Doctrinal Reference Publication (ADRP) 7-0: Training Units and Developing Leaders*. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2012.

_____. *Army Handbook for Self-Development*. Fort Leavenworth: Combined Arms Center—Center for Army Leadership, n.d. http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/CAL/resource-library.asp (accessed January 28, 2012).

_____. *Army Leader Development Strategy*. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2009.

_____. *Army Learning Policy and Systems*. TRADOC Regulation 350-70. Fort Eustis: Headquarters, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2011.

_____. *Army Leader Self-Development Reference Guide*. Fort Leavenworth: Combined Arms Center—Center for Army Leadership, n.d. http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/CAL/resource-library.asp (accessed January 28, 2012).

_____. *Army Training and Leader Development*. Army Regulation 350-1. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2011.

_____. *A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army 2012*, by John M. McHugh. 112th Cong., 2d sess. Report. Washington, DC, 2012.

_____. "Command Overview - Brief." U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. http://www.tradoc.army.mil/FrontPageContent/Docs/Command%20Brief_SEPT12.pdf (accessed April 9, 2013).

_____. *Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management*. Pamphlet 600-3. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2010.

_____. *Evaluation Reporting System*. Army Regulation 623-3. Washington, DC, 2012.

_____, "MSCoE OPORD, 11-16, Maneuver Support Center of Excellence (MSCoE) Campaign Plan (CP) Fiscal Years 2011-2012."(Fort Leonard Wood: Headquarters, Maneuver Support Center of Excellence, 2011), 3. (In author's collection.)

_____. *TRADOC Strategic Plan*. Fort Eustis: Headquarters, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2012.

_____. *U.S. Forces Command Campaign Plan 2011-2015*. Fort McPhearson: Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces Command, 2010.

U.S. Department of Defense. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs). *A Speech As Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates,* West Point, 2011.

_____. *Decade of War, Volume I: Enduring Lessons from the Past Decade of Operations.* Suffolk: Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis, Joint Staff - J7, 2012. http://server16040.contentdm.oclc.org/u?/p4013coll11,2035 (accessed March 18, 2013).

_____. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. *Enhancing Adaptability of U.S. Military Forces*. Defense Science Board Report. Washington, DC, 2011.

Wardynski, Casey. *Towards a U. S. Army Officer Corps Strategy for Success: Developing Talent, Volume 5*. Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2010.

_____. *Towards a U.S. Army Officer Corps Strategy for Success: Employing Talent, Volume 6*. Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2010.

"Who We Are." U.S. Army Maneuver Center of Excellence. http://www.benning.army.mil/WhoWeAreFull.html (accessed March 20, 2013).